Marcotte, Schrager, Healy, Rancourt, Cournoyer

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court allowing the appeal from a conviction and ordering a new trial. Allowed; a sentencing hearing is ordered before another judge.

The respondent is accused of speeding, in violation of section 329 of the Highway Safety Code (CQLR, c. C-24.2). The trial judge concluded that it was an strict liability offence, but nevertheless examined, then rejected, the respondent’s defence of reasonable mistake of fact based on the claim that his speedometer was malfunctioning. On appeal, the Superior Court judge, relying on the presumption that provincial penal offences in Quebec are characterized as strict liability offences, concluded that speeding was a strict liability offence.

The general principle of interpretation established in R. v. Sault Ste-Marie (City), (S.C. Can., 1978-05-01), SOQUIJ AZ-78111157, [1978] 2 SCR 1299, that in the absence of specific language indicating a contrary intention on the legislature’s part, a regulatory offence will be presumed to be one of strict liability, is well established in Quebec. Any previous jurisprudence on the classification of provincial penal offences that is inconsistent with it must be considered overruled.

The general principle can be summarized in two points. First, a penal offence under the authority of provincial law in Quebec is presumptively characterised as an offence of strict liability except if the statutory language, expressly or by necessary implication, compels an interpretation that the offence requires proof of an element of fault or is an offence of absolute liability. Such an exception must be justified by the party that seeks to rely on it. Second, offences of strict liability often allow specific defences according to the terms of the particular statutory scheme in which they are found. They also allow general defences that must be proved on a balance of probabilities, which include: any ground that negates proof of the actus reus; due diligence; reasonable mistakes of fact; mental disorder; and necessity. This general principle eliminates ambiguity in the characterisation of provincial penal offences in Quebec, the exceptions will apply only if there is a clear indication of the legislature’s intent.

In the present case, nothing in the text of section 329 in the Highway Safety Code, be it the overall regulatory arrangement established by the National Assembly, the subject matter of the legislation, or the nature and significance of the penalty, indicates an intention to displace the presumption that the offence is one of strict liability Therefore, the Superior Court committed no error in ruling that the offence of speeding is an offence of strict liability.

Text of the decision: http://citoyens.soquij.qc.ca