Schrager, Hamilton and Beaupré

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Québec granting the respondents’ application to dismiss based on prescription. Dismissed.

On July 28, 2012, the appellant was violently arrested by a police officer of the respondent city. On February 7, 2013, he filed a complaint with the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. On August 8, 2014, the Commission sent the appellant a refusal to act on his behalf because his action was prescribed under section 586 of the Cities and Towns Act (CQLR, c. C-19). On September 22, 2014, the appellant applied for judicial review of this decision. On October 11, 2016, the Commission and the appellant entered into a transaction. In exchange for financial compensation, the appellant agreed to discontinue his application for judicial review, which he did on October 18, 2016. On October 4, 2019, the appellant brought an action for damages against the respondents before the Small Claims Division of the Court of Québec. On February 7, 2020, he brought a new action, this time in the Civil Division of the Court of Québec. The trial judge granted the respondents’ application to dismiss based on the prescription of that action, brought more than 7 years after the events.

According to section 76 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms (CQLR, c. C-12), the appellant’s complaint to the Commission suspended prescription of his civil action against the respondents until the date he was notified that it refused to act on his behalf. Prescription of the appellant’s civil action was thus suspended for a period of 18 months. Moreover, notwithstanding the wording of section 76 of the Charter, the application for judicial review of the Commission’s decision had the effect of continuing the suspension resulting from the complaint until the Superior Court upheld or reversed the validity of that decision. However, as the application for judicial review was settled by the transaction on October 11, 2016, this argument can add only 26 months to the suspension, for a total of 44 months. As the total time between the beginning of the prescriptive period and the civil action is at least 86 months, a 44-month suspension reduces this period to 42 months, which is insufficient to avoid the 3-year prescription (article 2930 of the Civil Code of Québec (S.Q. 1991, c. 64) (C.C.Q.)).

The appellant incorrectly states that under article 2896 C.C.Q., prescription continued to be interrupted until the application for judicial review was settled. One, the application was not an action against the respondents. Two, the legislature decided that the complaint to the Commission had the effect of suspending prescription.  It would therefore be inconsistent to find that, since the appellant brought an application for judicial review of the Commission’s decision, he suddenly benefitted from the interruption under article 2892 C.C.Q. such that the respondents lose the benefit of the period already elapsed between the appellant’s arrest and his complaint to the Commission (a period of 6 months and 10 days).  

Last, the respondents were not parties to the transaction. Therefore, even if the transaction acknowledged that the appellant had a right, which is contested, this acknowledgement is by the Commission, not the respondents, and cannot be set up against them. Thus, the prescriptive period was not interrupted under article 2898 C.C.Q.

Legislation interpreted: section 76 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms

Text of the decision: http://citoyens.soquij.qc.ca