Bich, Bachand, Kalichman

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing a declinatory exception based on article 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CQLR, c. C-25.01). Allowed.

The appellant, the owner of a building currently operated as a private seniors’ residence (PSR), sent the lessees a notice of eviction due to a change of destination, unless the lessees agreed to become [translation] “simple lessees”. Despite the objection filed by the lessees before the Administrative Housing Tribunal (AHT), the respondent lessee, acting on her own behalf and on behalf of the 56 other residents who mandated her for that purpose, instituted an application for an injunction before the Superior Court. The trial judge dismissed the appellant’s declinatory exception against this application after concluding that the dispute between the parties fell under the jurisdiction of the Superior Court due, in particular, to its exclusive jurisdiction with respect to injunctions and the nature of the dispute. The judge rendered a safeguard order requiring the appellant to take the necessary measures to maintain the building’s operation and its certification as a category 1 PSR. This order was renewed until September 18, 2023.

The trial judge erred in his application of the two-step analytical approach set out in Procureur général du Québec c. Groleau (C.A., 2022-04-26), 2022 QCCA 545, SOQUIJ AZ-51847663, 2022EXP-1232, 2022EXPT-1072, for distinguishing the jurisdiction of the Superior Court from that of another tribunal.

Generally, it is not the nature of the remedy sought that determines ratione materiae jurisdiction over the dispute, but the nature of the dispute itself. The fact that the action includes remedies or procedural vehicles that expressly fall under the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, such as the injunction sought by the respondent in this case, does not mean that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the legislature on a particular subject to another tribunal, such as the AHT, can be circumvented. In addition, a lower tribunal may have complete jurisdiction over the merits of a dispute even though it does not have the power to render orders intended to safeguard the rights of the parties during the proceedings. In such a case, the Superior Court may provide assistance by rendering temporary orders that safeguard the rights of the parties. The issue is therefore not whether the AHT can render a safeguard order, but whether it may validly be seized, on the merits, of the matter the respondent instead decided to present to the Superior Court.

It may be noted from a review of the statutory provisions governing the AHT's jurisdiction that the AHT has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the subjects listed in section 28 of the Act respecting the Administrative Housing Tribunal (CQLR c. T-15.01), as well as over disputes related to those subjects, to the exclusion of any other tribunal, including the Superior Court. This jurisdiction extends to all questions of fact or law that may be raised by such disputes, and it is not appropriate to try to distinguish them to avoid this jurisdiction in favour of the courts of justice.

In this case, the dispute between the parties falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the AHT pursuant to section 28 of the Act. The AHT can decide the respondent’s action objecting to the eviction while ruling on the true intention of the lessor and, more generally, on the lawfulness of the change of destination, based on the relevant statutory or regulatory provisions, including the provisions of the Civil Code of Québec (S.Q. 1991, c. 64), which extend beyond just the provisions set out in the chapter on leases of dwellings.

Text of the decision: http://citoyens.soquij.qc.ca