Dufresne, Schrager, Roy
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court convicting the appellant on various counts of sexual assault. Dismissed.
The grounds of appeal are limited to the judgment in which the trial judge dismissed a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay.
Although the judgment under appeal was rendered before R. v. Jordan (S.C. Can., 2016-07-08), 2016 SCC 27, SOQUIJ AZ-51302609, 2016EXP-2173, J.E. 2016-1212,  1 S.C.R. 631, the Court is bound to apply the principles. The trial judge committed certain errors, but they are not determinative. By subtracting part of the delay for evidence disclosure, which must be attributed to the defence, the total delay does not exceed the 30-month presumptive ceiling. The presumption of an unreasonable delay therefore does not arise. It falls to the defence to establish that the delay markedly exceeded the time a similar case reasonably should have taken to complete, which it failed to do. Even though it is not required for this analysis, it should be noted that, in the circumstances, the delay due to the Crown attorney’s unexpected extended leave of absence related to an adoption is a discrete event that the Court would have considered had the presumption applied.
*Summary by SOQUIJ
Text of the decision: Http://citoyens.soquij.qc.ca